

## Superstars Make Even More!

# How Much?

- Average CEO in a Fortune 500 company makes US\$12 million
- *Forbes* estimated that Naomi Osaka made \$37.4 million in 2020
- *Le Parisien* said Lionel Messi's salary at PSG is between \$41 and \$47 million
- Nicole Kidman made \$22 million
- Dwayne Johnson, the highest paid actor in 2020, made \$87.5 million
- Jacky Chan made \$40 million
- J.K. Rowling earned \$60 million last year

# Basic Ingredients

- Consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality entertainment/service
- Low quality and low price substitutes are difficult to compete because:
  - consumers often have to pay a fixed time cost
  - price competition may give way to competition for attention
- Modern communications technology make the entire world market within reach
- So markets increasingly exhibit winner-take-all characteristics

# Congestion

- But one cannot take the entire market; expanding the market will lead to “congestion effects”
  - replication is not completely costless and is not perfect—live performance may be more enjoyable than listening to a digital reproduction of a song on Spotify
  - some may claim that a smaller, more intimate concert is better than one held in a large stadium
  - consumers’ tastes are different: catering to a larger market may require appealing to the lowest common denominator
- Congestion tends to limit the winner-take-all effect

# The Economics of Superstars

- The value of a star's service to each consumer depends on her quality and the size of the market she serves:

$$p = h(q, m) = q - a \left( \frac{m}{q} \right)^b$$

- higher quality stars ( $q$ ) produce more valuable service
- a larger market ( $m$ ) reduces the value of the service (congestion effect)
- congestion effects are less important when  $b$  is smaller
- congestion effects are less important for high quality stars:  
 $\partial h / \partial m = -ab(1/m)(m/q)^b$  becomes smaller (in absolute value) when  $q$  becomes larger

# Market size

- The star chooses market size  $m$  to maximize total revenue:

$$R^* = \max_m pm = \left( q - a \left( \frac{m}{q} \right)^b \right) m$$

- The first-order condition is

$$\left( q - a \left( \frac{m}{q} \right)^b \right) + m \left( -ab \frac{1}{m} \left( \frac{m}{q} \right)^b \right) = 0$$

- This reduces to

$$m^* = \frac{q^{1+1/b}}{(a(b+1))^{1/b}}$$

- higher quality stars serve bigger markets
- higher quality stars serve **much bigger** markets when congestion is weak:
  - if  $b = 1$ , a star who is twice as good as another serves a market four times as large
  - if  $b = 0.1$ , a star who is twice as good serves a market more than 2000 times as large

# Price of Service

- Substitute the optimal value  $m^*$  gives

$$p^* = h(q, m^*) = \left( q - a \left( \frac{m^*}{q} \right)^b \right) = q \left( \frac{b}{b+1} \right)$$

- Higher quality stars command a higher price  $p^*$  for their service despite congestion
- When congestion is weak, the prices are **lower** and **less variable** with respect to quality:
  - if  $b = 1$ ,  $p^* = (1/2)q$
  - if  $b = 0.1$ ,  $p^* = (1/11)q$

# Superstar Earnings

- Superstars earn a lot more both because (1) they command a high price and (2) they serve a larger market
- Substitute  $p^*$  and  $m^*$  into the revenue function to get:

$$R^* = q \left( \frac{b}{b+1} \right) \left( \frac{q^{1+1/b}}{(a(b+1))^{1/b}} \right) = \frac{bq^{2+1/b}}{a^{1/b}(b+1)^{1+1/b}}$$

- If  $b = 1$ , a star twice as good as another earns eight times as much
- If  $b = 0.1$ , a star twice as good as another earns more than 4000 times as much