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Summer Microeconomics Seminars
Hosted by
University of British Columbia;
School of Economics and Finance &
The Hong Kong Institute of Economics and Business Strategy
The University of Hong Kong
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Programme

3 Aug (Wed)

4 Aug (Thu)

5 Aug (Fri)

3 August 2011 (Wednesday)
10:00-10:30 Registration
10:30-12:00 Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality
@ Dan BERNHARDT, University of Illinois
12:00-14:30 Conference Lunch
14:30-16:00 Authority, Consensus and Governance
@ Archishman CHAKRABORTY, York University
16:00-16:30 Tea Break
16:30-18:00 Does Simple Majority Rule Produce Hasty Decisions?
@ Jimmy CHAN, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
4 August 2011 (Thursday)
10:30-12:00 Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information
@ Bruno STRULOVICI, Northwestern University
12:00-14:30 Conference Lunch
14:30-16:00 Information Acquisition, Moral Hazard, and Rewarding for Bad News
@ Hector CHADE, Arizona State University
16:00-16:30 Tea Break
16:30-18:00 Repo, Haircuts, and Liquidity
@ Tri Vi DANG, Columbia University
5 August 2011 (Friday)
10:30-12:00 A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability in Infinite-Horizon Games
@ Muhamet YILDIZ, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
12:00-14:30 Conference Lunch
14:30-16:00 Strategic Information Acquisition
@ Sergei SEVERINOV, University of British Columbia
16:00-16:30 Tea Break
16:30-18:00 On Collusion in Bertrand Competition with Asymmetric Firms
@ Ichiro OBARA, University of California Los Angeles
18:00-21:00 Conference Dinner
 
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