Summer Microeconomics Seminars <Programme>

Summer Microeconomics Seminars
Hosted by
University of British Columbia;
School of Economics and Finance &
The Hong Kong Institute of Economics and Business Strategy
The University of Hong Kong

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Programme

Venue

Programme

3 August 2011 (Wednesday)
10:00-10:30	Registration
10:30-12:00	Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality
	Dan BERNHARDT, University of Illinois
12:00-14:30	Conference Lunch
14:30-16:00	Authority, Consensus and Governance
	Archishman CHAKRABORTY, York University
16:00-16:30	Tea Break
16:30-18:00	Does Simple Majority Rule Produce Hasty Decisions?
	Jimmy CHAN, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
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4 August 2011 (Thursday)
10:30-12:00	Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Moral Hazard and Persistent Private Information
	Bruno STRULOVICI, Northwestern University
12:00-14:30	Conference Lunch
14:30-16:00	Information Acquisition, Moral Hazard, and Rewarding for Bad News
	Hector CHADE, Arizona State University
16:00-16:30	Tea Break
16:30-18:00	Repo, Haircuts, and Liquidity
	Tri Vi DANG, Columbia University
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5 August 2011 (Friday)
10:30-12:00	A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability in Infinite-Horizon Games
	Muhamet YILDIZ, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
12:00-14:30	Conference Lunch
14:30-16:00	Strategic Information Acquisition
	Sergei SEVERINOV, University of British Columbia
16:00-16:30	Tea Break
16:30-18:00	On Collusion in Bertrand Competition with Asymmetric Firms
	Ichiro OBARA, University of California Los Angeles
18:00-21:00	Conference Dinner
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